News from Malaysia:  Comparative Reflections by Steinman, Clay
Macalester International
Volume 12 Malaysia: Crossroads of Diversity in
Southeast Asia Article 22
Fall 2002
News from Malaysia: Comparative Reflections
Clay Steinman
Macalester College
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Global Citizenship at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Macalester International by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information,
please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steinman, Clay (2002) "News from Malaysia: Comparative Reflections," Macalester International: Vol. 12, Article 22.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol12/iss1/22
News from Malaysia:
Comparative Reflections
Clay Steinman
The month we traveled to Malaysia, January 2002, was a time still
marked by the horror of September 11th, so much so that many of our
loved ones worried about us while we were gone, needlessly it turned
out—or at least no more than one should worry about loved ones trav-
eling anywhere these days. While we did spend most of our time in the
most economically developed areas, the cities, what we saw was more
like home than I had expected — more affluent, more Westernized in
architecture and commerce, and more dominated by familiar dis-
courses, at least those that I could understand.
As a former journalist and one who teaches and writes about media
in the United States, I was struck by the formal similarities of the
Malaysian English-language newspapers to those in the United King-
dom and Commonwealth countries. I should not have been surprised,
given that Malaysia had been a British colony until 1957, and until
recently, its children had been required to learn English. Some of the
newspapers had at one time been owned by U.K. companies. In con-
trast, television news in Malaysia seemed mostly cloned in style from
local news in the United States.1 Those of us who value the press free-
dom guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
however, quickly ascertained the defining differences between U.S.
and Malaysian corporate media. In essence, Malaysian corporate
media are required to have government licenses (as only broadcast
channels are in the United States), and are owned either in large part
by the government, by the leading pro-government political parties, or
by political allies of the governing parties, which is not the case in the
U.S.2
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The familiar concept of “free press” carries as its shadow its puta-
tive opposite, which in market culture has come to mean forms of
media that are government controlled. Yet this is a contestable binary.
I would like to explore that binary, review its origins, and test its
applicability to the Malaysian news media, and then explore ways
these media may more closely resemble U.S. news media than this
binary indicates.
Common sense, in the United States, argues that the purpose of the
news media is to provide a check on government. Civics courses teach
that the First Amendment’s guaranteed freedoms are rooted in respon-
sibility: the responsibility of the media to protect democracy by speak-
ing truth to state power. This argument, in turn, rests on the
assumption that the unfettered exchange of ideas serves the common
interest as the surest road to truth, much as in capitalist economic the-
ory the invisible hand of the market is considered preferable to and, in
the end, more rational than social control.
The Bill of Rights, of course, was written in the 18th century, a time
when the few newspapers in existence were partisan organs supported
by cover prices that confined their circulation to elites. The change
began in the Jacksonian era of the 19th century, when white male liter-
acy and the right to vote were extended. Over the next two decades, in
response to this wider literacy and urbanization, entrepreneurs like
Benjamin Day (New York Sun), James Gordon Bennett (New York Her-
ald), Horace Greeley (New York Tribune), and Henry Raymond (New
York Times) realized that the real money in newspapers was the selling
to advertisers of access to consumer/readers’ eyes. They developed
popular newspapers that sold for a penny or two. Advertisers began
paying most of newspapers’ costs — something not envisioned by the
authors of the Bill of Rights.
Although the system took another century to refine (with profits
dependent mostly on advertising revenue rather than circulation), by
the 1950s, publishers and radio and television executives were increas-
ingly pushing the journalists who worked for them to be more politi-
cally bland, so that larger numbers of readers could identify with their
representations of the world, and to be more entertaining and service
oriented in a consumerist sense. To be sure, the commercial news
media did serve as government watchdogs, at least now and then (viz.,
CBS on Joe McCarthy and Vietnam, the Washington Post on Watergate,
the New York Times on the Pentagon Papers), but increasingly the thens
have outnumbered the nows as news budgets have been cut and con-
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glomeration has led to pressure for higher quarterly profits. For a
whole host of reasons, the watchdogs now are more likely to congre-
gate around the Bill Clintons and Gary Condits. Coverage of the Gulf
War and the Afghanistan War has been more characteristic of lapdogs
than watchdogs. Critical coverage of private power is rare, nearly
nonexistent, in fact, unless tracking government action or litigation
brought by others.
Yet because of the legal separation of media and the state in the U.S.,
news coverage here retains the potential to be critical. This is not the
case in a country like Malaysia. Although more social democratic than
the United States (e.g., it has universal health care, more progressive
income and luxury taxes, extensive if not adequate public housing),
Malaysia politically lacks crucial American freedoms (e.g., freedom of
the press and of assembly, the right of habeas corpus, an independent
judiciary, trial by jury, the right to engage in political activity for public
university students and professors). Economically, it is even more
neoliberal than the United States, promoting comparatively unfettered
private economic development as the key to future prosperity. It is not
surprising, then, that Malaysia’s news media are at the same time both
commercial and government controlled. While we were there, I heard
this system described as “authoritarian democracy.” Others call it “soft
authoritarianism.”3
*****
I spent 1986 in Beijing working as an editor for the Chinese govern-
ment at Xinhua, the New China News Agency, so I have some famil-
iarity with state media in a non-Western authoritarian country. Yet not
even Xinhua’s dispatches were as obviously party propaganda as a
typical issue of the New Straits Times, a leading English-language
“quality” newspaper in Malaysia. The New Straits Times is controlled
by the governing coalition, the United Malays National Organization
(UMNO), through investment and holding companies.4 In the January
24, 2002, edition of the paper, for example, the lead story is a UMNO-
sourced account of the return of a former opposition party to the rul-
ing coalition. Five stories on the topic dominate page two. There are
two other stories on the page: one reports about Malaysian Prime Min-
ister Mahathir Mohamad’s promise of “stern action against militants
and extremists”; and the other reports of a multimillion-dollar libel
suit planned by a government leader against an unidentified opposi-
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tion politician, a tactic favored by the rulers of Malaysia, and even
more by those of Singapore, for harassing and impoverishing what-
ever limited opposition exists. On page three, the main story reports
on the new loyalty oath for undergraduates at public universities.
According to the education minister, “The agreement requires them to,
among others, be loyal to the King, Government and university, and to
heed orders,” such as those against participation in politics. It also says
an official student organization had compiled a list of the “names of
lecturers spreading anti-Government messages,” and that the educa-
tion minister would soon take action against them. On page four, the
lead story quotes the head of a party in the governing coalition advis-
ing the opposition to learn from its mistakes in a recent election.
Another story, about supposed anti-government activities in some
Islamic schools, quotes the education minister as saying, “I understand
that there are students being taught to hate leaders and tear up their
pictures,” and asking for a new law to close schools where this is hap-
pening. Yet another story features a coalition leader denying his party
committed sabotage in a recent election, although it doesn’t clearly
state what kind of sabotage might have been involved. Not one of
these stories gave sources with other points of view significant space.
We saw examples like these in the media day after day.
Unlike traditional state media in Communist countries, the media in
Malaysia are not obviously government run. Most people we spoke
with knew who controlled what, but many (yet by no means all) also
seemed to lack a clear sense of precisely what arguments the opposi-
tion might have offered that were absent from the government-con-
trolled news.5 However cynically the media might be viewed, they
accomplish their work of denying access to competing voices, and sup-
port for the ruling coalition in Malaysia seems to be overwhelming. I
learned that many journalists want to do critical reporting but cannot,
given the draconian laws and self-censorship — unless there are vocal
splits within the ruling groups.
As I was completing this essay, The New York Times published two
articles that include material that illustrates how the distinction
between the “soft authoritarianism” of Malaysia and our “empire
democracy” has become so uncomfortably blurred, accelerating devel-
opments that began with the onset of the Cold War and the creation of
what Robert Corber and others have called the National Security
State.6 The first article reports on declassified documents about the
Angolan war of the mid-1970s, pried out of the U.S. government with
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the Freedom of Information Act (itself under attack from military
agencies and their supporters).7 The story indicates that the documents
“seem to overturn conventional explanations of the war’s origins.”
This understates the situation. After U.S. covert involvement was
exposed, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and others baldly lied to
Congress and the U.S. people, saying that the U.S. had intervened in
Angola (on the side of South African-supported guerillas against a left-
wing government) to counter what was called an “invasion” by Cuban
troops on the Angolan government’s side. Kissinger and others said
that the Cuban support for the Angolan government was a “Commu-
nist take-over” since, as Howard W. French put it in the recent Times
article, “Cuban troops in the continent were typically seen as foot sol-
diers for Soviet imperialism.” However, as French reports, the docu-
ments show that the United States intervened on the South African
side before any Cubans arrived — indeed, before the Central Intelli-
gence Agency had any inkling at all that Cubans were on their way.
According to research based on the documents, which also includes
material from Cuban, Angolan, and other archives, when Cuba did
send 5,000 troops, it was in response to a CIA-financed invasion
through Zaire. Contrary to U.S. disinformation, the Cubans were not
only not agents of the U.S.S.R., they initially came to Africa without the
U.S.S.R.’s permission.
In The Truth About Lies, his 1989 PBS documentary about the history
of U.S. government deception, Bill Moyers demonstrates how vulnera-
ble we are to such fabrications, uncontested in the news media until
their exposure years or even decades later, long after anyone can do
much about them, except, perhaps, for those wanting to settle old
scores. Such lies devastate democratic decision making all the more in
and around wartime. There is no reason to believe that these untruths
do not continue, and this raises questions about the efficacy of the
news media, even unlicensed and with backing by the First Amend-
ment, to provide a check on government that protects us against dicta-
torial power.
Television entertainment in Malaysia has become dominated by
U.S. and Hong Kong programs despite nominal government commit-
ment to indigenous production.8 Between 70 and 80 percent of televi-
sion programs, including satellite programs, are not of Malaysian
origin, and 60 percent of those come from the United States.9 My infor-
mants told me that aside from normal sexual censorship, government
control of television was mostly limited to news programs — for local
Clay Steinman
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entertainment programs, self-censorship sufficed. In the United States,
of course, commercial entertainment programs do occasionally cri-
tique government policies, however gingerly. There is The West Wing,
for example, which interestingly enough is popular on Malaysian gov-
ernment TV as well. But if the government in Malaysia does not choose
to make its entertainment programs an arm of the state, the same can-
not be said in the United States—as the second illustrative Times article
shows.10
The April 30, 2002, episode of JAG (short for Judge Advocate Gen-
eral — naval prosecutors and defense lawyers) was at this writing
scheduled to show a fictional version of the military tribunals revived
after September 11 by the Bush administration and denounced by civil
libertarians. This version, based on confidential Pentagon briefings for
one of the show’s writers, “will show conscientious JAG officers treat-
ing terrorist suspects to many of the rights of the judicial system.” This
idealized version of the tribunals was designed by the Pentagon to
influence the U.S. public outside of normal journalism. The Pentagon
regularly cooperates with television shows and movies in ways that
make them “a tool of wartime public policy.” The article quotes the
star of JAG as saying, “We send our scripts to our [Pentagon] liaison
and they weigh in on it,” and the producers tend to follow what the
Pentagon says, “because they certainly lend a great deal of production
value that we couldn’t buy.” Pentagon officials confirmed that they
were less likely to give a show free assistance if that show told a story
from a point of view that the Pentagon did not like. The creator and
executive producer of JAG said the news “puts forth the glass half
empty, and we put forth the glass half full.” One might want to argue
over the fractions, but there is little argument among media scholars
that many people get more “news” from fictional programs than they
do from those that represent themselves as journalism.11 The makers of
JAG “want to show people that the tribunals are not what many people
feared they would be.” The writer of the episode told the Times that,
“he felt obliged to inject heroism into the story to raise the morale of
viewers and the troops.”
*****
Here, then, we have a popular commercial television show glorifying
the military trials that the American Civil Liberties Union and others
have condemned as violations of human rights and international law
Macalester International Vol. 12
214
(i.e., they can be conducted in secret; evidence can be introduced with-
out the defendant being able to confront it; a guilty verdict requires
only a two-thirds majority of the military officers on the tribunal’s jury;
and there is no adequate right to appeal).12 No doubt civil liberties con-
scious U.S. citizens watching the equivalent show on Malaysian televi-
sion would label it as government propaganda.
In his valuable book Agents of Power, J. Herbert Altschull argues that
whatever the form of press ownership in a country, “the news media
are agents of those who exercise political and economic power.”13 In
both Malaysia and the United States that power is economic, but in
Malaysia it is more directly political. The elites who control the media
in the United States may be connected to the political elites but they
are not identical to them. Combined with journalists’ professional
obligations, that opens up spaces of possibility, however meek. The
two Times articles expose state media power but their existence also
contests that power.
Democratic media require a democratic social system, one gen-
uinely multiple in its structures of influence and power. A democratic
media system should “empower people by enabling them to explore
where their interest lies,” “foster sectional solidarities and assist the
functioning of organizations necessary for the effective representation
of collective interests,” “sustain vigilant scrutiny of government and
centers of power,” “provide a source of protection or redress for weak
and unorganized interests,” and “create the conditions for real societal
agreement or compromise based on an open working through of dif-
ferences rather than a contrived consensus based on elite domi-
nance.”14 It requires multiple sources of political and economic power
so that it is accountable to multiple groups and interests. In this sense,
the Malaysian media system has little to do with democratic goals. In
the United States, those goals do survive, if in residual form. Yet with
more conglomerate pressure for profit, more government deregula-
tion, or with one or two more September 11s, even that residual could
be lost. Economic policy or political pressure rooted in fear could make
our major media as unified as the counterparts we observed in
Malaysia. 
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Notes
I am grateful to Macalester College and to Ahmed Samatar, Michael Monahan, and the
staff at the Macalester International Center for supporting and organizing this seminar.
Special thanks in Malaysia to confidential informants in the media and to our hosts at
the University of Science in Malaysia in Penang, most especially to Dr. P. “Mourthy”
Sundramoorthy, Chair of Sociology and Anthropology, and to Dr. Shanti Balraj Baboo,
Professor of Mass Communication. My fellow travelers from Macalester, especially the
off-campus research teams, contributed much to my experience and choice of materials.
1. Journalists I interviewed told me that the Bahasa Malayu, Chinese, and Tamil newspa-
pers and programs were similar in content to their English-language counterparts, but I
cannot verify this personally.
2. A. Lin Neumann, “Malaysia’s Press remains Shackled as the Country prepares for
Snap Elections,” Committee to Protect Journalists Briefings: Press Freedom Reports from
Around the World (30 November 1999), found at http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/
Malaysia/Malaysia22nov99.html#neumann. Interviews with Malaysian journalists and
media scholars in January 2002 confirmed this analysis. For a more scholarly view, see
Indrajit Banerjee, “Cultural Industries and Cultural Dynamics in Malaysia: Critical Prob-
lems of Content in the Age of Infrastructure,” Jurnal Komnikasi 16 (2000): 33–50. Banerjee
argues that the privatization of formerly state media has, in the end, only led to more
state intervention, through regulation and indirect ownership via ruling political parties
(p. 40). I am grateful to colleagues in the Department of Communication at the
Malaysian National University for their hospitality and insights, and for making avail-
able this and other sources.
3. Claudia Derichs, “Competing Politicians, Competing Visions: Mahathir Mohamad’s
Wawasan 2020 and Anwar Ibrahim’s Asian Renaissance,” in Mahathir’s Administration: Per-
formance and Crisis in Governance, edited by Ho Khai Leong and James Chin (Singapore:
Times Books, 2001), p. 188.
4. Banerjee, p. 40.
5. I understand that what we were told by people with whom we spoke may not have
been identical to what they knew.
6. Robert J. Corber, In the Name of National Security: Hitchcock, Homophobia, and the Political
Construction of Gender in Postwar America (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).
7. Howard W. French, “From Old Files, a New Story of U.S. Role in Angolan War,” The
New York Times, Late National Edition (31 March 2002): 4; Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Mis-
sions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1956–1976 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2002).
8. Zaharom Nain, “Pathetic Press: Journalism that Fits and (what happens to) Journalists
who Don’t,” http://www.malaysia.net/aliran/high9808.html. Nain’s article appears on
the website of the independent periodical Aliran Monthly, a valuable source of critical
news and information about Malaysia, as is http://malaysiakini.com. Johan Saravana-
muttu has argued that the Internet has become home to independent journalism in
Malaysia, though he warns that even cyber publications are “not free from the long arms
of government surveillance, control and manipulation.” See Savanamuttu, “Reflections
of a Journalist of the 1960s: Malaysian Journalism in the Doldrums,”
http://www.malaysia.net/aliran/monthly/2001/1d.html. For more about the Internet
in Malaysia, see Jörg Becker and Rahmah Hashim, eds., Internet in Malaysia (Selangor
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Darul Ehsan: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2001). I was told that all Malaysian Inter-
net connections go through a government-related ISP, so that it may be that Malaysians
who visit these sites may face consequences if that becomes government policy. In any
case, as of 2000, only about 11 percent of Malaysians had any Internet access at all
(Banerjee, p. 41).
9. Banerjee, p. 42.
10. Katharine Q. Seelye, “Public Relations: Pentagon Plays Role in Fictional Terror
Drama,” The New York Times, Late National Edition (31 March 2002): 12. All subsequent
references to this matter are from Seelye’s article.
11. See Michael X. Delli Carpini and Bruce A. Williams, “ ‘Fictional’ and ‘Non-Fictional’
Television Celebrates Earth Day: Or, Politics is Comedy Plus Pretense,” Cultural Studies
8.1 (January 1994): 74–98.
12. http://www.aclu.org/congress/l112901b.html.
13. J. Herbert Altschull, Agents of Power: The Media and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (White
Plains: Longman, 1995), p. 440.
14. James Curran, “Rethinking Media and Democracy,” in Mass Media and Society, 3rd
ed., edited by James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (London: Arnold, 2000), p. 148.
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